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ABSTRACT
This study examines the association between the voluntary disclosure of economic and financial information and earnings 
management. The outlined arguments on the subject are based on the assumption that consistent voluntary disclosure 
policies may reduce earnings management. The analysis is conducted on a random sample of 66 non-financial Brazilian listed 
companies in the 2005-2012 period. To measure voluntary disclosure, the index proposed by Consoni and Colauto (2016) is 
used. As a proxy for earnings management, discretionary accruals (DA) are estimated based on the model by Dechow, Sloan, 
and Sweeney (1995). The relationship between these measurements is analyzed using a model of simultaneous equations 
and by the random effects regression method with panel data. A significant negative relationship was expected a priori; 
however, the main result of the study indicates that voluntary disclosure and earnings management are not simultaneously 
determined or associated. Although the results obtained contradict certain theoretical assumptions, there are alternative 
explanations for this finding. The empirical set of evidence in this research, in addition to those in previous studies, should be 
interpreted with caution because there is no consensus on the measures for voluntary disclosure and earnings management. 
Second, several companies in Brazil may not be interested in providing high-quality voluntary disclosure because most of 
their shareholders enjoy private benefits of control. This issue reduces the importance of the potential market demand for 
information, stratifies information asymmetry, and does not prevent earnings management.
Keywords: accounting information, voluntary disclosure, earnings management, emerging markets, discretionary accruals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although it is well known that corporate disclosure 
brings advantages such as greater stock market liquidity 
and a lower cost of capital (Botosan 1997, 2006; Lopes 
& Alencar 2010; Welker 1995), managers are not always 
willing to increase the level of accounting disclosure. In 
addition to these benefi ts, there are most likely competing 
elements that may justify tighter managerial control over 
information, contributing to the importance of decisions 
about whether to disclose information.
Managers generally have access to more specifi c and 
accurate information about a company’s business than 
do other market actors, but they may want to disclose or 
retain that information to serve their personal interests 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). According to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986), in deciding which information to 
report, managers attempt to evaluate how alternative 
methods will aff ect their wealth.
According to Dye (1988), a manager enjoys an 
advantage over stockholders with regard to information 
because it is diﬃ  cult for the latter to directly observe the 
company’s performance and therefore identify its future 
business prospects. In this sense, Scott (2012) observes 
that this information asymmetry creates ideal conditions 
for selective and distorted information reporting and a 
temptation to moral hazard. Th us, greater information 
asymmetry allows managers to use their discretion for 
the specifi c purpose of managing accounting results.
Information asymmetry can be reduced through 
voluntary disclosure and tighter regulation (Scott, 2012). 
However, regulation in the context of agency confl ict 
works only if the regulator can require the disclosure 
of information that market participants are unwilling 
to disclose voluntarily (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 
2010). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), the 
recognition, measurement, and disclosure of accounting 
data are not always guided by impartial decisions, but 
can be driven by economic incentives that maximize 
the expected utility of one of the interested parties. 
Managers overlook the fact that, in earnings management, 
accounting choices should be guided by the economic 
fundamentals of the company’s business.
Th e guiding hypothesis of this study is that voluntary 
disclosure and earnings management are negatively related 
because this relationship is based on the relationship of 
each of these variables with information asymmetry. Healy 
and Palepu (2001), Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007), 
and Verrecchia (1983) present voluntary disclosure as a 
factor that contributes to the reduction of information 
asymmetry. For Dye (1985, 1988) and Schipper (1989), 
among others, the information asymmetry between 
managers and investors is the necessary condition for 
earnings management. From this perspective, this study 
aims to investigate the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure of economic and fi nancial information and 
earnings management in the Brazilian capital market.
Voluntary disclosure and earnings management are 
recurring themes in research on fi nance and accounting. 
However, there is little empirical evidence on the 
relationship between them that is specifi c to the Brazilian 
capital market. One example is the study by Murcia and 
Wuerges (2011), who explore this relationship from 2006 
to 2008 using a sample of the 100 largest companies listed 
on the São Paulo Stock Exchange, Commodities and 
Futures (BM&FBOVESPA) and report a partially negative 
association between voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management.
To deepen this discussion, the time period of 2005-
2012 is explored. Part of this period is marked by 
adjustments resulting from the process of alignment 
with international accounting standards starting in 2008. 
Consoni and Colauto (2016) present evidence that this 
process can be understood as an exogenous factor that 
had a signifi cant positive eff ect on voluntary disclosure 
in Brazil. Th erefore, the index proposed by Consoni 
and Colauto (2016) is adopted as a metric for voluntary 
disclosure and, diff erent from that of Murcia and Wuerges 
(2011), the proxy for earnings management that is used 
is the discretionary accruals (DA) estimated using the 
model by Dechow et al. (1995).
Th e analysis performed in this study reveals that 
voluntary disclosure and earnings management are neither 
co-determined nor associated. Th at is, the absence of a 
relationship between the variables investigated suggests 
that disclosure decisions are not an important determinant 
for the practice of earnings management in Brazil. For the 
U.S.A. (Jo & Kim, 2007; Lobo & Zhou, 2001) and British 
(Iatridis & Kadorinis, 2009) markets, there is evidence 
of a negative association. Th us, it should be noted that 
diff erent proxies for voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management make direct comparison diﬃ  cult. Moreover, 
institutional diff erences between markets may infl uence 
both voluntary disclosure and earnings management.
Another crucial element is the understanding of 
voluntary disclosure as a response to information 
asymmetry. As observed by Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 
(2008), the assumption that voluntary disclosure is a 
determinant of the quality of earnings reported by 
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companies ignores the fact that the voluntary disclosure 
may itself be based on poor-quality information. Th is 
point must be discussed and other methodologies must 
be used to better understand the behavior of voluntary 
disclosure and earnings management in the Brazilian 
context.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Information
The demand for additional resources always 
increases when new investment opportunities appear 
and new investment opportunities are themselves likely 
to be associated with a widening gap in the information 
asymmetry between “insiders” and “outsiders” (Healy 
& Palepu, 2001). Analytical models, such as those 
developed by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Glosten 
and Milgrom (1985), and Kim and Verrecchia (1994), 
show that information asymmetry decreases as the level 
of voluntary disclosure of information rises because and 
this can reduce the adverse selection component of the 
bid-ask spread (the mechanism for price protection when 
shares are bought and sold). As a result, the trade volume 
and stock market liquidity increase, possibly reducing 
the cost of capital.
According to Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), 
and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), without information 
disclosure, investors would be unable to distinguish 
between high-quality and low-quality stocks. A lack of 
information would lead investors to reexamine their 
beliefs about the company’s value and, logically, off er an 
average price for the entire group of stocks evaluated. In 
this sense, managers have an incentive to disclose all of the 
data at their disposal to distinguish themselves from those 
with less favorable data. In turn, theory about voluntary 
corporate disclosure has concentrated on identifying the 
reasons that full disclosure does not in fact occur.
Some of the research conducted by Robert E. 
Verrecchia and Ronald A. Dye, or research to which 
these authors contributed, has aimed to formulate 
models to explain partial voluntary disclosure. Refuting 
Verrecchia’s thesis (2001) that there is no unifi ed theory 
of voluntary disclosure, Dye (2001) demonstrates that his 
arguments diff er from those of Verrecchia in that they 
consider models of voluntary disclosure to be essentially 
endogenous, whereas Verrecchia (2001) attributes the 
same status to endogenous and exogenous models.
According to Dye (2001), the idea that voluntary 
disclosure is eﬃ  cient and contributes to eﬃ  cient resource 
allocation in the capital market is related to the credibility 
of the fi nancial data disclosed. Although Verrecchia 
(2001) notes managers’ propensity not to disclose data 
that are essentially true, Dye (2001) argues that Verrecchia 
omits what he considers the determining factor in the 
disclosure’s credibility, earnings management.
In this sense, Core (2001) argues that unbiased 
disclosure is not a manager’s ideal, given that it carries 
a high cost. This conclusion is based on Watts and 
Zimmerman’s understanding (1986, p. 205) that not all 
accounting manipulation is eliminated and that only in 
capital markets with rational expectations will managers 
fail to benefi t from manipulation. Th e notion that it is very 
expensive to eliminate manipulation entirely indicates 
that managers can introduce some disclosure bias at a 
low personal cost.
In Verrecchia’s model (1983), the disclosure costs 
that hinder full disclosure do not vary based on the 
information that the manager possesses. In Verrecchia’s 
view (1983), the discretionary disclosure policy of 
managers is infl uenced by the costs of disclosing data, but 
the managers’ only motivation for divulging information 
is its eff ect on the company’s value.
In contrast, Dye (1985, 1986) claims that disclosure 
costs vary with the nature of what is being disclosed. If 
investors are uncertain whether managers withhold private 
information, they cannot interpret a lack of information 
as a sign that the company in question is withholding bad 
news. In the eyes of investors, Dye argues, companies with 
bad news are therefore indistinguishable from companies 
that make no disclosures.
Uncertainty over how investors will interpret a 
disclosure causes managers to publish data based on 
how they believe investors will interpret it (Dye, 1985). 
To correctly interpret a manager’s action, it is necessary 
to identify the manager’s incentives to disclose good or 
bad news and the entire set of data that the manager 
could have disclosed, but chose not to. Discussion of 
this question has led Dye (2001) to state that voluntary 
disclosure is a special case of Game Th eory because it is 
not always possible to conclude that managers disclose 
only information calculated to raise the company’s stock 
price and hide information that will reduce it. Th e reason 
is that bad news may be released during labor negotiations 
or when options are being granted and good news may 
be released at the time these options are exercised.
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It is interesting to note that the benefi ts of corporate 
disclosure typically result in voluntary information 
disclosure, but not of all the information to which 
company management is privy. As noted by Dye (2001), 
the best information for the purpose of negotiating 
contracts is not necessarily the best information on which 
an investor should base a decision. Th erefore, managers 
can strategically choose what to disclose and when to 
disclose it, provided that investors are uncertain as so 
what information the managers possess.
2.2 Earnings Management
Earnings management has been studied from many 
perspectives and methods. As a result, Mulford and 
Comiskey (2002) report that diff erent characterizations 
have arisen, such as income smoothing, the reduction of 
current profi ts for the sake of future profi ts (big bath), 
creative accounting, and cosmetic fi nancial statements 
(window-dressing), among others.
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) and Schipper (1989, p. 
92) explain that earnings management can aim to modify 
both profi t measures and economic and fi nancial ratios, 
thereby modifying the form and content of accounting 
information. It is thus supposed that the practice of 
earnings management can interfere with the credibility 
of accounting data and its utility for decision-making by 
market actors. Th us, if earnings management is viewed 
as an opportunistic act, it must be viewed as reducing the 
quality of the published disclosure.
For Arthur Levitt (1998), former president of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), earnings 
management stems from a decline in the quality of fi nancial 
information disclosure, and measures requiring greater 
transparency and oversight of the fi nancial statement 
disclosure process would be necessary to contain it. In 
Brazil, the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM, by its 
Portuguese abbreviation) has also spoken on this subject. 
In Circular n. 480 (14 February 2007) (Comissão de 
Valores Mobiliários/Normas Contábeis e Auditoria/
Superintendência de Relações com Empresas, 2007), the 
CVM declared that it considers earnings management to 
be an arbitrary form of discretion intended to infl uence 
or manipulate accounting numbers, though it falls within 
the limits of the law.
Despite the reduction in data reliability that oft en 
accompanies the practice of earnings management, there 
are arguments that this practice can be useful if kept 
within certain limits. Fields, Lys, and Vincent (2001) and 
Schipper (1989) argue that earnings management may 
reveal information about the company’s value. In this 
sense, Subramanyam (1996) and Burgstahler, Hail, and 
Leuz (2006) refer to the practice of earnings management 
as an opportunistic behavior, but not when management’s 
discretion is used to better communicate the company’s 
underlying economic and fi nancial performance. Th us, 
if earnings management is used responsibly, then this 
practice can transmit private information to the market 
about expectations for future corporate earnings.
According to Dechow and Skinner (2000), the diff erent 
interpretations of earnings management agree that the 
practice requires intentional management, but it is not 
clear whether that intention is merely opportunistic or 
designed to convey private information to investors. 
As a result, this aspect makes it diﬃ  cult to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of the motivations for this 
practice and leads to widely diff ering empirical results.
According to Schipper (1989, p. 95), it is the 
persistence of information asymmetry that makes 
earnings management possible. Th is condition arises 
from a contractually established form of communication 
that cannot be eliminated without changing the contract. 
Along this same line of reasoning, Dye (1988) argues 
that earnings management occurs when one or more 
hypotheses of the Revelation Principle are violated, given 
that monitoring mechanisms would force managers to 
reveal the truth about the information that they possess.
Th e Revelation Principle is present in the literature on 
the design of mechanisms. In this context, mechanisms 
refer to a set of incentives that causes the agent to act in a 
manner that maximizes utility for the principal (Myerson, 
1979). According to Lambert (2001), the premises of the 
Revelation Principle are related to communication, the 
form of the contract, and the commitment taken on. 
Th us, the author explains that, according to the logic of 
mechanisms, when agents receive private information, 
they have the ability to transmit the information in its 
fullest dimension, i.e., when there are two signals, they 
will be transmitted as two separate messages rather than 
being aggregated into a single message.
Arya, Glover, and Sunder (1998) emphasize that 
individuals do not blindly follow the provisions established 
in contracts; as a result, problems in the mechanism’s 
design arise from the diﬃ  culty of ensuring that the 
contracting parties fully disclose the information in their 
possession. In Dye’s view (1988), when the mechanism 
is ineﬃ  cient, managers hold an informational advantage 
over shareholders, which leads them to exercise their 
discretionary power to apply accounting standards 
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in a manner that serves their own interest, given that 
shareholders cannot perfectly monitor the company’s 
performance and observe the prospects of the business 
environment. Dye (2001) addresses this issue, noting 
that Verrecchia (2001) neglects what he considers to be 
the determining factor in the information’s credibility, 
earnings management.
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), managers 
sometimes have the power to determine when an event 
will be shown in the accounts and which transactions 
will aff ect the results reported, such as the appropriation 
of a certain expense, revenue, and the disposal of assets. 
In this sense, Bushman, Engel, and Smith (2006) explain 
that profi t may not be a good indicator for monitoring 
managers’ eff orts. One reason is that managers may choose 
accounting policies to maximize their own expected 
utility, managing the earnings opportunistically, and/or 
by reducing voluntary disclosure.
As suggested by LaFond and Watts (2008, p. 450), the 
private benefi ts of control give managers incentives to 
use private information to transfer wealth to themselves, 
“even in the absence of fi nancial-reporting-based debt and 
compensation contracts”. Furthermore, the institutional 
environment can interfere and provide various incentives 
for the practice of earnings management. Th e level of 
protection for the investor can guide corporate choices 
on issues such as governance, the dividend policy, the 
financial structure, and the shareholder control of 
companies.
Th e literature on earnings management suggests 
many explanations and/or motivations for this practice, 
with each of the explanations being applied to particular 
circumstances. Healy (1996, p. 108-109) suggests that the 
motivations for earnings management are ambiguous, 
making it diﬃ  cult to establish appropriate methods 
for analyzing a certain behavior. In any given group of 
companies, some may act to reduce profi t to reduce their 
tax burden or discourage potential competition, whereas 
others may infl ate profi ts to maximize bonuses, meet 
analysts’ projections, or obtain loans. Furthermore, all 
of these behaviors may be present in the same company 
over a given period.
Due to the variety of environments in which businesses 
operate, it is diﬃ  cult for a single explanation to cover 
all environments. In summary, it appears that earnings 
management occurs because there is no precise measure of 
net income and because the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) cannot completely constrain the 
subjectivity inherent in accounting policy choices and 
in certain practices. Many decisions about accounting 
choices are complex and defy a simple answer about 
which best informs the investor.
Th erefore, the issue of information asymmetry presents 
itself as a link between voluntary disclosure and earnings 
management and supports the research hypothesis. To 
inform stakeholders, managers can voluntarily disclose 
qualitative and quantitative information that goes beyond 
that which is required by law.
Th rough voluntary disclosure, managers can show 
current and prospective earnings to those interested in the 
fi nancial position of the company or they can clarify and 
explain the criteria adopted for the company’s formulation 
of its accounting policies and estimates (Lundholm, 2003). 
According to Lambert et al. (2007), this eff ort aims to 
reduce information asymmetry and thereby increase 
investors’ ability to make decisions and accurately monitor 
their investments.
Dye (1985, 1988) and Schipper (1989) consider 
the information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders to be a necessary condition for earnings 
management. Schipper (1989) states that high levels 
of information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders indicate a lack of sufficient resources, 
incentives, or access to relevant information for managers’ 
actions to be monitored.
Trueman and Titman (1988) base their work on 
the assumption that voluntary disclosure increases 
transparency and that earnings management would 
therefore be more easily detected by shareholders of 
companies with a more consistent voluntary disclosure 
policy. Under these circumstances, managers would be 
less likely to practice earnings management because 
its purpose and eff ectiveness depend on the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and other 
market participants. Th us, managers would limit the 
level of voluntary disclosure if they wanted to maintain 
the fl exibility to engage in earnings management.
Richardson (2000) explores these arguments, 
suggesting that the level of earnings management 
increases as the level of information asymmetry increases; 
testing this relationship, he fi nds a positive correlation. 
Richardson believes that this evidence indicates that, when 
information asymmetry is high, parties interested in the 
accounting data cannot obtain access to the information 
necessary to prevent accounting manipulation. Th erefore, 
as information asymmetry increases, managers can use 
their discretion to manage reported earnings. Along 
the same lines, Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009), Jo and 
Kim (2007), and Lobo and Zhou (2001) fi nd voluntary 
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disclosure to be inversely correlated with earnings 
management. Based on the theoretical predictions and 
empirical results discussed, the research hypothesis is 
as follows:
H1: as the index of voluntary disclosure of 
economic and fi nancial information increases, 
the level of earnings management decreases.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Measurement of Voluntary Disclosure
To explore what underlies the objective of this study 
and the specifi cs of the context being analyzed, as Botosan 
(2004) refers to it, this study employs the metric proposed 
by Consoni and Colauto (2016) for measuring the content 
of voluntary disclosures (Table 1). Th ese researchers 
conceive the metric grounded in Brazilian studies and 
defi ne its content based on the elements that continue 
to be voluntary over the time period of the study. Th is 
aspect of the methodology is relevant in the context of this 
analysis because, starting in 2008, Brazil began the process 
of aligning with the international accounting standards. In 
addition, in 2009, the CVM began to require companies 
to fi le a Reference Form, which replaced the Annual 
Information Form (IAN, by its Portuguese abbreviation), 
and contributed to changing the nature of disclosure 
and increasing the volume and detail of the disclosed 
information.
Table 1 Voluntary disclosure index
Market view
1 Competitive analysis
2 Market share
3 Assessment of major economic trends market
4 Government infl uence on the company activities
Corporate strategy
5 Plans and corporate objectives
6 Alignment of company activities with the stated objectives
7 Prospect of new investments
8 Sales forecasts
9 Earnings forecasts
10 Cash fl ow forecasts
Economic and fi nancial performance
11 Variation in the inventories of goods for sale, inputs or fi nished products
12 Variation in the level of receivables
13 Variation in the volume of sales
14 Variation in the level of administrative and commercial expenses
15 Variation in the level of operational earnings
16 Variation in the cost of goods sold, the products manufactured or services provided
17 Financial effect from the raising of short and long-term third-party resources
18 Financial effect from the application of own resources
19 Performance of common and preferred shares
20 Global indicators (EVA, EBITDA, MVA)
21 Cost of equity
Operational aspects
22 Current production compared to the installed capacity
23 Operational effi ciency measures
24 Dependence of technology, suppliers, customers and labor
25 Investments and divestments
26 Resources invested in human capital management
27 Resources invested in education projects, culture and social development
Source: Adapted from Consoni and Colauto (2016).
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Th is metric favors economic-fi nancial information, 
although voluntary disclosure is not restricted to this 
content. It is understood that this limitation guides the 
analysis and is primarily due to the diﬃ  culty of evaluating 
the disclosure of socio-environmental information in 
heterogeneous samples. Occasionally, this type of 
information is linked to details of corporate activities in 
certain segments of the market and may even be disclosed 
to meet regulatory requirements for that sector of the 
market.
Th e procedures for data collection are the same as those 
adopted by Consoni and Colauto (2016), aligning the scope 
of each item of the metric with the content of statements 
in the Management Report and, where applicable, in 
some sections of the IAN and Reference Form. To take 
advantage of the fact that some companies disclose more 
detailed information, these researchers defi ne coding 
criteria that consider how detailed the information is, in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms. Th erefore, when 
no information is available for a certain item, a score of 0 
is assigned; when only qualitative information is available, 
presented in descriptive terms, 1 point is assigned; and 
when both qualitative and quantitative information is 
available (in monetary or non-monetary terms), 2 points 
are assigned.
Th e absolute individual score ranges from 0 to 54 
points (27 items measured, each worth a maximum 
of 2 points). Th e index, which is a proxy for voluntary 
disclosure, is obtained by dividing of the absolute score 
of each company for each year by the maximum possible 
score. Th e closer the ratio is to 1, the better the company’s 
voluntary disclosure is.
Along the same line presented by Francis et al. (2008), it 
is understood that a voluntary disclosure policy comprises 
a stable set of disclosure practices. Although voluntary 
disclosure also occurs in conference calls, websites, 
and newspapers, the documents cited are consulted 
because they are subject to a fairly uniform presentation 
framework, making it possible to compare companies and 
monitor the regularity of their disclosures.
3.2 Measuring Earnings Management
According to Dechow and Dichev (2002, p. 39-
40), accruals are temporary adjustments that delay or 
anticipate the recognition of cash fl ows. Because not all 
fi nancial decisions are directed at earnings management, 
researchers have separated total accruals into discretionary 
(opportunistic behavior) and non-discretionary (related to 
the level of business activity) accruals. Th e literature off ers 
a variety of models for estimating DA, many of which 
are attempts to improve on previous models. For this 
study, we use the model by Dechow et al. (1995), known 
as the Modifi ed Jones model. Th is model uses aggregate 
accruals to try to estimate a “normal” level of accruals 
and deviations from this level are considered evidence of 
earnings management. Th e advantages and disadvantages 
of this model have been discussed by Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand (2010), DeFond (2010), Fields et al. (2001), 
Guay, Kothari, and Watts (1996), Lo (2008), Th omas 
and Zhang (2000), and Young (1999), among others, 
but no alternative approach off ers a superior solution. 
According to Subramanyam (1996), the DA estimated 
by this model are priced by the market.
To estimate the DA, it is fi rst necessary to calculate the 
total accruals obtained using the balance sheet approach. 
Th e total accruals of company i at time t is defi ned as 
follows:
1
Voluntary disclosure and its relationship with earnings management: evidence from the Brazilian capital market
256 R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 74, p. 249-263, mai./ago. 2017
where TAi,t is the total accruals of company i at time t, 
∆CAi,t is the variation in the current assets of company i 
at the end of time t-1 to the end of time t,  ∆Cashi,t is the 
variation in the available cash of company i from the end 
of time t-1 to the end of time t, ∆CLi,t is the variation in 
the current liabilities of company i from the end of time 
t-1 to the end of time t, ∆CLFi,t is the variation in the 
short-term loans and fi nancing of company i from the 
end of time t-1 to the end of time t, Depri,t is the amount 
of depreciation, amortization, and depletion of company 
i during time t, and Ai,t-1 is the total assets of the company 
at the end of time t-1.
DA are estimated using pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) with the following equation:
where ∆REVi,t is the variation in the net revenue of 
company i from time t-1 to time t, weighted by the total 
assets at the end of time t-1, ∆RECi,t is the variation in the 
accounts receivable (net) of company i from time t-1 to 
time t, weighted by the total assets at the end of time t-1, 
PPEi,t is the balance of the fi xed asset accounts (gross) of 
company i from time t-1 to time t, weighted by the total 
assets at the end of time t-1, and εi,t is the error term of 
company i for time t.
All model variables are defl ated by the total assets of 
the previous time period (Ai,t-1) to minimize the eff ect 
of company size and the problem of heteroscedasticity. 
Regarding the parameters of the modifi ed Jones model, 
the fi xed assets and the diff erence in variation between net 
revenue and accounts receivable are the main drivers of 
the process of recognizing accruals. Using the estimated 
coeﬃ  cients α1 and α2 of each company-year (equation 2), 
the non-DA (NDAi,t) are calculated as follows:
Th e absolute DA (DAi,t) represent the diff erence between total accruals (TAi,t) and non-DA (NDAi,t) as follows:
In this sense, DA are the residuals of the regression. 
Th e farther the residual is from 0 (whether positive or 
negative), the greater the level of earnings management 
is. Table 2 shows the estimates of the parameters obtained 
by the Modifi ed Jones model.
2
3
4
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Table 2 Coef cients estimated by the Modi ed Jones model (2005-2012)
Expected sign Coeffi cient Standard Error t p-value VIF
Constant 0.0595 0.0261 2.2788 0.0231** -
α1 2330.4 1109.42 2.1006 0.0362** 1.001
α2 +/- -0.2219 0.0454 -4.8874 0.0000*** 1.002
α3 - -0.0872 0.0452 -1.9283 0.0544* 1.003
R2 0.0565
R2- adjusted 0.0511
F (3.524) 10.46***
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.000
White’s test 39.11***
Normality of residuals 125.55***
Observations 528
Note: the dependent variable is total accruals (TA). 
coef cient α1 =  1/Ai,t-1; coef cient α2 = variation in the net revenue of company i from time t-1 to time t, weighted by the total 
assets at the end of time t-1, minus the variation in accounts receivable of company i from time t-1 to time t, weighted by the 
total assets at the end of time t-1; coef cient α3 = balances of  xed assets accounts (gross) of company i at the end of time t, 
weighted by total assets at end of time t-1; VIF = variance in ation factor. 
*, **, ***: signi cant at the 10, 5, and 1 levels, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Th e variance infl ation factor shows that the model does 
not have multicollinearity problems in the specifi cation. 
Th e Durbin-Watson statistic shows that there is no serial 
autocorrelation. In turn, the model’s residuals do not 
follow a normal distribution. Nevertheless, according 
to Wooldridge (2002, p. 167), the OLS estimators satisfy 
asymptotic normality; that is, they have an approximately 
normal distribution in suﬃ  ciently large sample sizes. 
White’s test detects heteroscedasticity, which makes the 
OLS estimators ineﬃ  cient.
Th e α2 coeﬃ  cient is negative and related to the diff erence 
in variation between net revenue and accounts receivable. 
Th eoretically, the sign expected for this coeﬃ  cient is 
diﬃ  cult to predict because it is related to the increase 
in accruals, both for increasing and decreasing reported 
earnings. Th e α3 coeﬃ  cient represents fi xed assets, which 
is responsible for expenses associated with depreciation, 
amortization, and depletion and, as expected, is positively 
correlated with these expenses.
3.3 Statistical Model
The research strategy is designed based on a 
simultaneous equations model. From the theoretical 
arguments outlined in the literature, it is assumed 
that corporate disclosure policy and the management 
of accounting data result from endogenous decisions. 
Th erefore, the following two structural equations are 
defi ned to compose the system of simultaneous equations:
where DAi,t is the discretionary accruals of company i 
at time t, VDIi,t is the index of voluntary disclosure of 
company i at time t, ROAi,t-1 is the ln of the profi tability of 
corporate assets for company i from the end of time t-1 
to the end of time t, LEVi,t is the ln of the book leverage 
of company i at the end of time t, LIQi,t is a dummy for 
the liquidity of the shares of company i at the end of time 
t, IFRSi,t is a dummy for the period of alignment with 
international fi nancial reporting standards of company 
i at time t, taking the value of 1 for the 2009-2012 period 
and 0 otherwise, SIZEi,t is the size of the company, as 
measured by the ln of the total assets of company i at 
time t,  CONi,t is the control rights, as measured by the 
percentage of common shares held by the main controlling 
shareholder or the sum of the percentages of common 
shares held by those who participate in the shareholders’ 
agreement for company i at time t, and εi,t is the error 
term for company i at time t.
5
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Th e two-stage least squares (2SLS) method is used to 
estimate the system of simultaneous equations. Th e OLS 
method produces inconsistent estimators for models 
with endogenous explanatory variables. In turn, if no 
endogenous explanatory variables exist, or in the case 
of weak instruments, then the 2SLS method produces 
ineﬃ  cient estimators, i.e., they lack the minimum variance.
3.4 Sample
Th is study employs the same sample of companies 
that is used in Consoni and Colauto (2016). Th e sampling 
procedure favors the random selection of companies 
that have maintained an active registration in the 
BM&FBOVESPA during the 2005-2012 period, excluding 
fi nancial companies. By calculating the minimum size for 
fi nite populations, with a signifi cance level of 5% and a 
10% margin of error, Consoni and Colauto obtain a sample 
of 66 companies, representing 32% of the population 
considered.
Th ese criteria lead to the formation of a balanced 
panel containing 568 observation-years. Companies in 
the electric power and the steel and metallurgy sectors 
predominate in the sample, totaling 30%. Over 55% of 
the sample companies belong to the traditional market 
and, on average, the concentration of control rights is 
73%, as measured by the percentage of common shares 
held by the controlling shareholder or, in some specifi c 
cases, the sum of common shares held by participants in 
the shareholders’ agreement.
In considering whether the sample is appropriate for 
the aims of this study and, consequently, the analysis of its 
results, the following factors are taken into consideration: 
(i) Th e sample has survival bias; that is, companies that 
closed or went public aft er 2005 are not included in the 
sample. Including only companies with active registrations 
makes it possible to indirectly control for the potential 
eff ects of economic and regulatory changes on the main 
variables of the study, particularly on voluntary disclosure. 
In addition, this study seeks to monitor the consistency 
of companies’ voluntary disclosure policies. However, 
the survival bias makes it more diﬃ  cult to generalize the 
results; (ii) To avoid impairing the measurement of some 
variables, such as the proxy for earnings management, 
companies in the finance and insurance sector are 
excluded from the sample because they have their own 
rules, chart of accounts, and specifi c property that are 
not comparable to other sectors; (iii) A sample of 66 
company-years makes it possible to construct a disclosure 
index, given that, according to Core (2001), disclosure 
indices require intensive manual labor and are viable 
only for small samples.
4. RESULTS
4.1  Regression Analysis Using 2SLS
Th e results obtained by the 2SLS and the diagnostic statistics for the estimates are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Summary of results for the two-stage least squares regression
Independent variables Equation 5 Equation 6
VDI instrumented -0.7102*** (0.2470) -
DA instrumented -0.0224* (0.0120)
Auxiliary regression
Instruments Endogenous VDI Endogenous DA
VDIt-1
0.8495***
(0.0473)
VDIt-2
0.0464
(0.0464)
DAt-1
0.4313***
(0.0428)
DAt-2
0.5273***
(0.0425)
Shea partial R2 0.7909 0.9079
Sargan 0.473 0.160
Cont.
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Th e Shea R2 statistic from the fi rst-stage regression 
indicates that the instruments are relevant in explaining the 
endogenous regressors. To ensure over identifi cation, the 
lagged endogenous variables are used as instruments. Th e 
Sargan test of over identifying restrictions is used to assess 
the fi t of the instruments. Th is test evaluates the statistical 
plausibility of the assumption that the instruments are 
exogenous. Th e result shows that the instruments are 
statistically relevant. To perform analyses with appropriate 
estimators, it is necessary to test simultaneity between DA 
and VDI, adopting the Wu-Hausman specifi cation test. 
Th e test indicates that the residuals are not signifi cant, 
as reported in Table 3; thus, it is impossible to reject the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity. In other words, DA and 
VDI show no simultaneous relationship in this model.
Th e estimation of models with endogenous explanatory 
variables by the OLS method produces inconsistent 
estimators. However, the 2SLS method for estimating 
models produces ineﬃ  cient estimators that lack the 
minimum variance when no endogenous explanatory 
variables exist or in the case of weak instruments. Because 
there are no indications of simultaneity, it is more eﬃ  cient 
to use the OLS method.
4.2 Regression Analysis of Panel Data
Panel data, specifi cally the fi xed eff ects model, may be 
used to identify the sequential interrelationship between 
the DA and VDI variables. However, if only one of the 
relationships is signifi cant, a unidirectional relationship 
will be observed between these variables. Th erefore, the 
equations are estimated individually. First, the functional 
relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables is tested to observe the behavior of the VDI 
variable and of the control variables in relation to the 
DA and vice versa.
The Hausman test for the null hypothesis of the 
consistency of random eff ects estimators indicates that 
the fi xed eff ects estimators are less eﬃ  cient; thus, the 
random eff ects model is deemed more suitable. Th e results 
of the panel diagnostic tests and other results are shown 
in Table 4.
p-value 0.4916 0.6893
Hansen J 9.86 6.60
p-value 0.079 0.252
Wu-Hausman 0.165 0.846
p-value 0.685 0.358
Observations 396 396
Equation 5: DAi,t = α0 + α1VDIi,t + α2ROAi,t-1 + α3LEVi,t + α4IFRSi,t + α5SIZEi,t + εi,t
Equation 6: VDIi,t = α0 + α1DAi,t + α2CONi,t + α3LIQi,t + α4IFRSi,t + α5SIZEi,t + εi,t
Note: standard error in parentheses. Regressions with exogenous variables not reported in table.
DA = discretionary accruals; VDI = voluntary disclosure index. 
*, **, ***: signi cant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Prepared by the authors.
Table 3 Cont.
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For the regression in which DA are the dependent 
variable, the only signifi cant variable is LEV. Th is positive 
and signifi cant relationship suggests that companies with 
high debt ratios tend to manage their earnings to show 
higher profi t. Because it is a log-level function, all things 
being equal, a 10% increase in leverage has, on average, 
practically no eff ect on earnings management. Th is result 
shows that, although signifi cant, the economic eff ect is 
very small. Th e other variables are not signifi cant, nor do 
they show signifi cant coeﬃ  cients. Th ese results contradict 
the theoretical assumption that these variables should be 
included in the model and, therefore, it is inferred that 
voluntary disclosure has no infl uence on variations in 
DA in the same time period. Th e analysis of the results 
for the regression in which voluntary disclosure (VDI) is 
the dependent variable shows that, with the exception of 
the ownership concentration variable (CON), the other 
control variables are signifi cant at the 1% or 5% level. 
Th e relationship of these variables is consistent with that 
which was expected.
Based on the results presented, a relationship between 
earnings management and voluntary disclosure in the 
2005-2012 period is not found by the simultaneity test; 
even the regression analysis with panel data fi nds no 
association between them. If a unidirectional relationship 
was found in the current period, then it may be inferred 
that a dependent relationship existed between the variables 
of interest; that is, the decision about whether to make 
voluntary disclosure would depend on the prior choice 
of accounting policy and vice versa.
To allow the analysis of the infl uence of the independent 
variables on the dependent variables over time, dummy 
variables are included to control this dimension. In this 
study, the dummies are presented for 2006 to 2012, 
given that 2005 is taken as the reference year. Only the 
year 2008 was found to be signifi cant in both models, 
it was demonstrated that there is a diff erence between 
the periods before and after 2008. This difference 
Table 4 Random effects model with panel data
Independent variables Expected  sign Equation 5 Expected sign Equation 6
VDI + 0.0253 (0.0956)
DA - -0.0127 (0.0165)
LEV + 0.1272*** (0.0376)
ROAt-1 + 0.3318 (0.2115)
CON - 0.0001 (0.0003)
LIQ + 0.0355** (0.0138)
SIZE - 0.0391 (0.0256) + 0.0544*** (0.0074)
IFRS +/- -0.0012 (0.0182) +/- 0.0566*** (0.0074)
Coeffi cient +/- -0.7832* (0.4068) +/- -0.4103*** (0.1066)
R2-within 0.04 0.25
R2-between 0.03 0.41
R2-overall 0.03 0.38
Observations 528 528
Panel diagnosis Coeffi cient p-value Coeffi cient p-value
Chow test 125.3300 0.0000 20.8789 0.0000
Breusch-Pagan test 1611.6700 0.0000 912.7820 0.0000
Wu-Hausman test 1.9844 0.8513 3.7747 0.5823
Equation 5: DAi,t = α0 + α1VDIi,t + α2ROAi,t-1 + α3LEVi,t + α4IFRSi,t + α5SIZEi,t + εi,t
Equation 6: VDIi,t = α0 + α1DAi,t + α2CONi,t + α3LIQi,t + α4IFRSi,t + α5SIZEi,t + εi,t
Note: standard error in parentheses.
DA = discretionary accruals; CON = stock concentration; IFRS = dummy for the period of alignment with international 
accounting standards; LEV = ln of the book leverage; LIQ = dummy for stock liquidity; ROAt-1 = ln of the  rst asset pro tability 
lag; SIZE = ln of total assets; VDI = voluntary disclosure index. 
*, **, ***: signi cant at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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may have occurred because many current accounting 
regulations went into eff ect that year as Brazil aligned 
with international accounting standards; 2008 was also 
the year of the subprime lending crisis.
Although it is found that the DA and VDI variables 
do not appear to be associated in the current period, this 
study seeks to determine whether the level of voluntary 
disclosure at t-1 aff ects earnings management and whether 
earnings management at t-1 aff ects voluntary disclosure. 
New tests are conducted to test the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure in the prior period and earnings 
management and vice versa. Tests to identify the most 
appropriate panel data approach are again performed. Th e 
fi rst two tests reject the null hypothesis that the pooled OLS 
model is appropriate, validating the alternative hypothesis 
that fi xed or random eff ects models are appropriate. Th e 
result of the Hausman test indicates the random eff ects 
model is the most appropriate. Overall, the results do not 
diff er from those found when the variables were analyzed 
for the current period alone (Table 4).
Th is fi nding shows that the relationship between 
earnings management and voluntary disclosure is 
not signifi cant. Th us, there is no evidence that greater 
voluntary disclosure is refl ected in a lesser propensity 
to manage earnings in the methodological context 
of this study. Th is fi nding contradicts the underlying 
theoretical assumptions and diff ers from the empirical 
results presented by Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009), Jo and 
Kim (2007), and Lobo and Zhou (2001) in addition to 
the study of Brazil by Murcia and Wuerges (2011). Th ese 
studies conclude that voluntary disclosure is one of the 
factors inhibiting the practice of earnings management. 
It is important to note that the diff erent methods and 
analyses used in each of these studies make it diﬃ  cult 
to draw direct comparisons with the results found in 
this study.
5. CONCLUSION
Th e theoretical assumptions of this study were that, 
when managers decide the level of voluntary disclosure, 
they may be inclined to practice earnings management 
to shape market actors’ perceptions to suit their plans, 
perhaps even acting in their own self-interest.
Th is study is based on the idea that voluntary disclosure 
contributes to the reduction or elimination of information 
asymmetry and that lower information asymmetry makes 
it more diﬃ  cult to engage in earnings management. 
Th erefore, companies with a higher index of voluntary 
disclosure tend not to practice earnings management. 
It was hypothesized that there is a negative relationship 
between these variables.
In the inferential analysis performed, it is found that 
voluntary disclosure and earnings management do not 
appear to be simultaneously determined. Based on the 
procedures employed in this study, it is not possible to 
infer a signifi cant relationship between the measures used. 
Accordingly, the results are inconclusive with regard to 
the ability of the voluntary disclosure variable to explain 
whether companies are likely to manage earnings. Th e 
lack of a relationship between earnings management and 
voluntary disclosure suggests that disclosure decisions 
are not a determining factor in companies’ involvement 
in earnings management in Brazil. 
Although it may seem that this result contrasts with the 
assumption that voluntary disclosure reduces information 
asymmetry and hence limits the opportunistic practice of 
earnings management, this study does not consider under 
which conditions and at what time full disclosure is likely 
to occur. A market that values additional information may 
help raise the level of voluntary disclosure and improve 
the quality of information disclosed. Th erefore, it is 
conceivable that the infl uence of voluntary disclosure 
on the extent of earnings management depends on the 
complex mix of companies’ characteristics and factors 
related to the institutional environment.
One possible explanation for the results obtained is the 
perception that, in Brazil, many companies may have no 
intention of making high-quality voluntary disclosures 
because their controlling shareholders are in a comfortable 
position, taking advantage of private benefi ts that fl ow 
from their preferential access to information. Th is situation 
reduces the importance of the potential market demand 
for information, stratifi es information asymmetry, and 
does not prevent opportunistic earnings management.
Th e companies listed on the BM&FBOVESPA have 
gradually improved some aspects of corporate governance, 
but change has been very uneven. Brazilian companies 
are still marked by highly concentrated ownership and 
fragile corporate governance, with the concentration of 
control being made possible by the large number of non-
voting (preferred) shares issued and the use of pyramidal 
structures (Silveira, Leal, Barros, & Carvalhal-da-Silva, 
2009).
Due to the survival bias that guided the sampling 
process and measurement of the earnings management 
variable and the voluntary disclosure variable, it is noted 
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that the reported results should be interpreted with 
caution. With regard to the estimation of DA, there are 
still doubts concerning the models’ ability to measure 
earnings management, that is, to accurately distinguish 
between discretionary and non-discretionary components. 
Th e choice of model used refl ects only the researcher’s 
choice because the study was not intended to prove its 
eff ectiveness.
Research into aspects of companies’ voluntary 
disclosure has diﬃ  culty obtaining an appropriate measure 
of disclosure. For various reasons, many researchers 
choose to develop their own measures. Although the 
metric’s construction is grounded in previous studies 
and care is taken to identify the items whose disclosure 
has over time ceased to be voluntary, the process is not 
without subjectivity. Subjectivity can be present both in 
the selection of items and in the process by which they 
are coded.
It appears that several issues still need to be discussed in 
future studies. One should bear in mind that the literature 
on voluntary disclosure and earnings management is very 
dispersed, at times resembling a puzzle. Th is situation may 
be due to the diff erences in the conceptual understanding 
of each researcher, as well as their motivations. It is 
crucial to understand voluntary disclosure as a response 
to information asymmetry. As noted by Francis et al. 
(2008), the idea that voluntary disclosure is a determinant 
of earnings management ignores the fact that voluntary 
disclosure may also be based on poor information. Th is 
aspect makes it particularly difficult to identify the 
interaction between earnings management and voluntary 
disclosure.
Moreover, one of the great challenges of empirical 
research into earnings management and voluntary 
disclosure is the question of causality. Due to the hypothesis 
of the endogenous nature of causality, it is diﬃ  cult to 
establish and identify the exact eff ect that one mechanism 
may have on the other. In this sense, the present study is 
only an attempt to investigate the relationship between 
them. Th e development or application of other methods 
can also make substantial contributions to this endeavor.
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